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Im2,or t Liber aliza tiQ.l l..Jll~ !l.h:
The Secon d Post-W ar Restr4 .ct~rjJ :IB,

Benja min Cohen
Gusta_v Ranis

Among the most perva sive of post-W orld War II pheno
mena has been the
attem pt of the less devel oped count ries (LDC I s) to
try to achie ve econo mic
indep enden ce to Suppl ement polit ical indep enden ce.

While it is, of cours e,

diffic ult to gener alize about the preci se natur e of
this pheno menon , two
featu res seem to recur :

one, the typic al LDC, even if not newly indep enden
t,

has been subje ct to a set of

11

colon ia.1" econo mic relati onshi ps as far as her

previo us foreig n conta cts are conce rned; and secon d,
the main instru ment for
develo pment in the post-w ar has been the attem pt by
LDC gover nment s to achie ve
a funda menta l restru cturin g of these relati onsh
ips.

In short , in pl.8ce of

the ninete ei:ith ceptu ry colon ial packa ge of priva te
capit al, trade , know- how,
and assur ed marke ts, orche strate d large ly by comm
ercial inter ests abroa d,

LDC gover nment s have now interp osed thems elves and exerc ise
their judgm ent on
how aid, trade and techn ical assis tance are best organ
ized and harne ssed for
natio nal growt h and econo mic indepe ndenc e,,
very distin ct patte rns.

-

..

--·-----

But thip effor t has follow ed two

·-

Imme diatel y 8fter the War and in the first flush of

indep enden ce LDC gover nment s attem pted to restru cture
the colon ial patte rn by
taking direc t actio n in a numbe r
and priva te activi t:i.es •

ot

marke ts and acros s a wide area of publi c

.1t--

,,.-----~-------~More recen tly, howev er,

we have been witne ssing what might be calle d

an agoni zing reapp raisa l among LDC gover nment s as to
the effec tiven ess of the
instru ments broug ht to bear..

This has led to the attem pt at a secon d re

struc turin g, in which the basic objec tives of gover
nment remai n the same but
the means of achie ving them are under going subst antia
l chang ea

-

---

-2The main purpo se of this paper is to attem pt
a fulle r unde rstan ding
of this two-p hased restr uctu ring effo rt by LDC
gover nmen ts.

We proce ed by

first , in Secti on I, delin eatin g very brief ly
the natur e of the colon ial
herit age.,

Secon dly, in Secti on II, the'im medi ate post- war
effor t by LDC

gover nmen ts is descr ibed and evalu ateda

Secti on III analy zes the gene ral

out lines of the chang e in attitu des-- and actio
ns-~w hich has taken place over
the past five to seven year s-•es pecia lly in the
forei gn trade secto r4
Secti on IV cites some parti cula r coun try cases
in evide nce; and Secti on V
tries to draw some gene ral conc lusio ns from the
evide nce prese nted.

1
The

11

typic a 111 LDC struc ture inhe rited from the pre••w
ar perio d cons ists

of three dome stic prod uctio n secto rs:

a subsi stenc e agric ultur al secto r

devot ed rna:Lnly to food produ ction , a smal ler
but often vigor ously growi ng
agric ultur al expo rt secto r produ cing mine rals
or cash crops for the forei gn
mark et, and a tradi ng cum servi ces secto r provi
ding the finan cial insti tutio ns
and overh eads to make the expo rt secto r expan
sion poss ible and to serve the
·needs of both the expo rt-or iente d entre prene ur
and the lande d aristo cracy .,
The expo rt secto r utili zes the reser voir of chea~
labor back in agric tiltur e
to expl oit spec ific clima te or geolo gy-ba sed
raw mate rials in the form of

fiber , tropi cal foods , or mine rals.

Inpu ts i.nto this secto r inclu de food

produ ced in the agric ultur al hinte rland and servi
ces produ ced by the comm er
ciali zed trade cum servi ces secto r.

The outpu t of this secto r flows entir ely

abroa d as part of what has been calle d the colon
ial patte rn:

i.e., the.

tradi tiona l expo rts which flow abroa d are requ
ited by simp le consu mer goods

-3for the worke rs being pulle d out of the agric ultur al
subsi stenc e secto r and
into the servi ces and expor t secto rs.

The profi ts from this tradin g patte rn,

to.th e exten t they .are not repat riated , and as augme
nted by net capit al flows ,
provi de for the impo rtatio n of capit al goods which
are reinv ested in the
agric ultur al expor t secto r or in the overh eads and
servic es which supp@ rt
that secto r ca
trade r to that

Incre asing ly, the role of the foreig ner expan ds from
that of

of

entre prene ur, servi cing or actua lly takin g over the
direc ..

tion of activ ity in the expor t secto r.

The servi ce secto r no longe r minis ters

to the feuda l needs of the nobil ity or the Churc h but
meets the deman ds of the
expor t secto r ·for the servi ces of banki ng, shipp ing,
insur ance, wareh ousin g,
etc.

At a later stage this secto r will also turn to the
const ructio n of

trade -rela ted socia l overh ead capit al (elec tric power
, trans porta tion, housi ng,
etc.)o

The main involv ement of the large and virtu ally stagn
ant agric ultur al

hinte rland in all this is to provi de labor and food
to the agric ultur al e;{port secto r and in retur n to receiv e incen tive consu
mer goods (e.g. , cloth , kerosene,

radio s) direc tly from abroa d.

As long as there is antic i-

patio n of contin uing profi table expor t oppo rtunit ies
profi ts are likely to be
reinv ested in the servi ce and/o r expor t secto r,

To the exten t prosp ects are

less brigh t, profi ts may be repat riated , but in any
case little dome stic in
vestm ent is under taken which does not bear direc tly
or indir ectly on the pro•
fitab ility of the tradit ional _expo rt activ ity.

While in this fashio n the

encla ve expor t secto r contin ues to grow in respo nse
to the foreig n marke t,
the dome stic econom y exper ience s little struc tural
chang e.

There is little

tende ncy for the gener ation of a dome stical ly orien
ted indus trial secto r,
little tende ncy to stimu late major incre ases in produ
ctivit y in the dome stical ly~
orien ted agric ultur al secto r and ·hence little oppor
tunity for growt h of these
,;;

two secto rs in a mutua lly reinfo rcing fashio n.

II

Given these initial conditio ns, it was clear that post-Wo rld War II
LOC governm ents would try to put their fingers on the critica l flows in the
colonia l resource flow pattern in order 'to insure that the proceeds of the
traditio nal agricul tural export sales abroad are not automat ically rein
vested for the exclusiv e benefit" ' of that sector and that the domestic indus
trial sector is given a new order

or

importan ce.

With little relevan t theory

to fall back upon and with no possibi lity at all of calling a moratori um on
the difficu lt policy choices that clearly had to be made, most less develope
d
country governm ents responde d to the common problem in somewha t similar ways.
They saw the issue basicall y through (early) Prebish eyes, ioe., with a mix
ture of concern about unfavor able foreign demand conditio ns for traditio nal
exports and a firm belief in the dynamic learning processe s associat ed with
the growth of a domesti cally oriented import substitu ting modern industr ial

i

structu re.

As a conseque nce they sought ways and means for the governme 11t to
interven e to restruct ure the flow of resource s in behalf of "long-te rm"
nationa l developm ent needs and away fr.om the "short-t erm" privat1: pr9£it
·seekers , at home and abroad, associa ted with the colonia l pattern.

This meant

first of all, assessin g, as best they could, total resource availab ilities
that could be counted on, from inside as well as outsi<le ,--now in the form
.

I

of governm ent to governm ent aid rather than private conm1erc ial investm ent-
and, secondly , deployin g these as effectiv ely as possible in pursuit of some
overall set of objectiv es, e.g., a politica lly determin ed minimum growth rate.·
In this process every LOC governm ent essentia lly lrns to face up to the same
problem , i.e., hm, to most effectiv ely organize the human and natural

reso rrces , actua l and pote ntial , of the parti cula
1
r geog raphi c entit y unde·.r
its cont rol for purpo ses of growt h., In virtu ally
all cases th:ts led to a
more or less consc ious and-m ore or less forma l attem
pt to plan for econo mic
devel opme nt, rangi ng on the one extre me from the
simpl e addin g up of minis -·
teria l inves tmen t budg ets to fairl y soph istic ated
5 year plans comp lete 1-Jith
notio ns of what the priva te secto r shoul d be asked
, induc ed, or coerc ed to
do,
All such effo rts, more over, clear ly bear the conse
nsus that the
gover nmen t can and shou ld provi de socia l and econo
mic overh eads, guara ntee
a minimum of law and order , and estab lish all the
oth,~r major. basic preM
cond ition s of devel opme nt; but there is much less
conse nsus on eithe r the
ideal divis ion of labor betwe en thE;! publi c and the
pYiv ate secto rs or on how
to organ ize the priva te secto r, i.e~, whet her to
induc e it or order it to take
certa in actio ns cons idere d socia lly desir able.
Clea rly many LDC gover nmen ts
have stron g ideol ogica l conv ictio ns as to -which
indu strie s must be in the
publi c secto r and there is a ,-,ide area of choic e
on how to try to affec t the
actio ns of what is left in priva te hand s. There
, in fact, exist s a virtu ally
conti nuou s spect rum along which the typic al· less
devel oped mixed eccmomy can
try to find a comf ortab le resti ng place . Neith er
the laiss ez~f aire presc ripq
tion of the textb ooks , on one extre me, nor gover nmen
t owne rship of all the·
rn€ans of produ ction , on. tl)e other ., has prove n very
relev ant iri terms of the
vast majo rity of the coun tries we are conce rned with.
But there do exist
very real choic es as betwe en the use of direc t and
indir ect cont rols;
betwe en tarif fs and quan titati ve restr ictio ns; betwe
en the direc t alloc ation
of cred it in the prese nce of very low inter est rates
J and its alloc ation as
a conse quenc e of the inter actio ns in the
mark et for cred it; betwe en, ·in

short ., the posit ion of havin g gover nmen t polic y
work ing throu gh the marke t
and gover nmen t polic y tryin g to displ ace the mark.
et,,
Most LOC I s faced with that choic e in the postMwa:r.
opted for a con
sider able measu re of gover nmen t owne rship and/o r
subs tanti al direc t contr ols
over the priva te secto rs There is no one sirnpl ~
expla natio n for this
phenomenon,- but a number of facto rs can be cited
.

First of all, there does

exist a clear inter actio n betwe en the natur e of
the propo sed colo nial re-
struc turin g job and the tools cons idere d appro priat
e for the purpo se~
Start ing from the alrea dy descr ibed patte rn of resou
rce.·f lows , the inten t,
broad ly speak ing was to redir ect the proce eds of
the tradi tion~ l expo rts,-
plus any forei gn capi tal inflo ws-~ into indu stry
and the overh eads supp ortin g
that indus tryo The tools used were excha nge contr
ols to sipho n off expo rt
earni ngs via the comp ulsor y surre nder of forei gn
excha nge and to alloc ate

impo rt l.:fcen ses to the socia lly desir able proje cts in
indu stry.

With gover n-

ment budg ets typic ally in defic i.t and infla tion2
ry press ures build ing up,
incre asing ly overv alued excha nge rates serve d to
subsi dize impo rters and those
who were opera ting the new indu stria l struc ture,
and to pena lize agric ultur e
and expo rters .
Basic to this twin decis ion on objec tives and instru
ment s was the
feeli ng that devel opme nt could now somehow be "orde
red" by the same patri ots
who- had previ ously succe eded in achie ving poli
tical cbang e.

Rela ted to this

was the funda ment al distr ust of the comp etitiv e
syste m alrea dy refer red to
which conti nues to perva de many of the newly indep
enden t coun tries of Asia,
Afric a and Latin America., All priva te initi ative
nnd prof it maxi miza tion
are distr usted becau se they are somehow assoc iated
with the wo:ckings of
colon ialism which stood to bene fit mainl y the expo
rt encla ve and the moth er
coun try. Even less devel oped coun tries which do
not profe ss to be soci alist

in orientati on are nationali st and therefore provide strong support for any
even ha 1£ way intellige nt autarkic policy.

Moreover, there is the normal

identific ation of industria lization with developme nt.

While it is clear that

successfu l growth ultimatel y means industria lization- •in terms of the well
known pressures of demand as well as in terms of an economy I s improving ski 11
bas~--the fact that the causation does not necessari ly run from industria liza
tion to successfu l developme nt was largely ignored •. The basic fact that an
economy saddled with a large and preponder ant agricultu ral hinl;:.erlan d must
somehow devise ways and means of enlisting its support as a fuell:i.ng device
for the industria lization effort was overlooke d.

Once there was a commitmen t

to controls, coupled with the realizati on of the difficult y of making decisions
relating to large numbers of widely dispersed decision-m akers in industry or
agricultu re, the. logic a 1. conch1sio n was· "to do what was feasible" , i.e .. , to
allocate iesources to the public sector and the large scale private sector
I

and to down-grad e would-be claimants outside of this rather narrow circle.
Also playing a role was the normal lack of civil service sympathy for and
understan ding of the tradition al agricultu ral sector where household and
productiv e units are merged,co upled with the overall feeling that anything
small-sca le, labor intensive or indigenou s rightly belongs to the past, and
that it is the tasl~ of those who build for the future to concentra te on the
latest, the most modern and the most imitative of western technique and out
put mixes.
As a consequen ce of all this much of the expansion in output took
place j_n the large-sca le industria l sector in accordanc e with an import sub
stitution policy in some order of technolog ical comple~d ty--althou gh even
here daring jumps to fairly sophistic ated productio n functi.ons were· often

·. ~sattempJed at an early stageo

Rapid rates of industr:i.a lization can, of

course., be achieved, --and were--but they are likely to be purchased at a
high price:
(1)

As we have already noted, the system discrimin ates against tradi··

tional exports, since a local producer can acquire more local currency by
saving a dollar of imports than by· earning a dollar 0£ exports.
time little incentive eKists
(2)

At the same

for the developme nt of new export industrie s.

There results a non-optim al compositi on of imports for any given

level of total imports, since imports are allocated on the basis of bureau
cratic decisions rather than by the marketpla ce.
(3)

The licensing of imports, moreover, tenqs to lead to excess

capacity .in the economyo

While excess capacity is not a logical concomita nt,

it is in fact ubiquitou s because a firm's license for imp_orted raw materials
is usually linked to its
defined.

11

rated 11 capacity, which is usu2lly conservat ively

A firm d.oes not, therefore. , have the option of expanding output by

running a second shift; it must expand its plant.
Normally, bursts of industria l expansion are followed by an inability
to provide the necessary raw materials · and spare parts, leading to substan
tial idleness of scarce capital and an ever more highly inefficie nt produc
tion structure .
(4)

Import licen&ing leads to large inventorie s,.

While licensing

gives the governmen t more assurance than does.the·m arketplac e in controlli ng,
the level of total imports, individua l firms have less certainty about
acquiring the amount of imports necessary to achieve th.e most profitabl e out- ·
put level, since profitab ility is not given much cqnsidera tion in the alloca
tion of licenses.

(5)

The contro l system absorbs the time of a large group of talente
d

people> both those in the governm ent who admini ster it and those
in the
private sector who respond to it.
(6)

Import licensi ng may lead to excess ively capita l-inten sive methods

of produc tion for those firms lucky enough to get import license
s (this is
in additio n to the capita l intens ity resulti ng from the pressur
es on firms
to expand their plants rather than run extra shifts ).

This underv aluatio n

of imports is couple d with the practic e of aid donor to emphas
ize the import CO!I'.ponent of capita l projec ts and the prefer ential tariff
treatme nt of
capita l goods. __

(7)

It is difficu lt to establi sh new firms., since a potent ial pro

ducer has no histor ical output as a baiis for receivi ng license
s.

On the other

hand, giving a new firm assured import license s is a good way
for the govern 
ment to insure its financ ial succes s.

(8)

Small firms are discrim inated agains t, since they cannot compete

with large firms in keeping full-tim e person nel in the capita l
to watch and
influen ce the alloca tion of import license s.

(9)

Agricu lture is usually neglec ted both in terms of the direct atten

tion paid to it but., more importa ntly., in terms of the incenti ves
provide d by
the price structu re.

Ultima tely this sector instead of being a major pro-

pelling device turns out to be- a major drag on the econom y, since
it often
becomes incapab le of even keeping up with popula tion increa ses,.
not to' speak: of
freeing worker s for indust rial growth "t-1ithout r'unning into food
shortag es and pre
mature ly rising wages.

As the terms of trade turn agains t industr y., imports

of food become necess ary even in areas which had traditi onally
been food ex~
por'ting .

-10··
(10)

The deve lopm ent proc ess is main ly fuellc ~d
by the reinv estm ent

of indu stria l prof its suppl e.me nted by forei
gn aid.

To the exte nt that any

savin gs are sque ezed out of agri cultu re
they are ttans ferre d to the large 
scal e impo rter and indu stria list enjo ying
subs tanti al grow th unde r hothous e cond ition s.

(11)

Fina lly, to roun d out this desc ripti on
of the norm al land scap e,

5 to 10 year s afte r the big p'ush £or indu
stria lizat ion .has gotte n unde r way,
you norm ally enco unte r a cont inuin g empl
oyme nt lag, i~e. , outp ut elas ticit ies
of indu stria l empl oyme nt 0£ aroun d .3, Le.
, high labo r prod ~ctiv ity on a

very smal l base abet ted by an artif icia lly
high prop ensit y
int~ hsiv e techn olog y

arld" thb

~

to impo rt capi tal

negl ett of indig enou s labo r using tech nolo
sy,

resu lting from the cont rol struc ture .
It is diff icul t to come up {vith a quan titat
ive meas ure of the cost s
asso ciate d with this syste m.
evid ence on this poin t.

Ther e e~is ts, houe verJ scat tered indi rect

Base d on a samp le of ten indu strie s, Anne
Krue-ge:c

estim ated that impo rt~su bstit ution indu
strie s in Turlt ey used 20-7 5 lira to
save a doll ar of impo rts and expo rt indu
strie s8-l l:. lira to earn a doll ar. 1In a stud y of Chil e's autom obile indu stry,
John son estim ated that abou t

J.2 escu dos were need ed to save a doll ar of
impo rts at a time when the
2·
offic ia 1 exch ange rate was 3 escud
os per doll ar. -

Paki stan i manu factu res

Lewi s estim ated that

.(nhi ch are main ly impo _rt-s ubst itute s) rece
ived abou t

l1-0 perc ent more rupe es per doll ar than
agri cult ural good s
I

(whic h are main ly

expo rts) in the early 60 1 s. 3

1

.

Anne o. Krue ger, "Som e Econ omic Cost s of
Exch ange Cont rol: The
Tµrk ish Case ", JEE. (Octo ber 1%6 ) J Tabl
e 3,. colum n 5.
2
Lelan d J. John son, "Prob lems of Impo rt Subs
tHut ion: The Chil ean
Auto mobi le Indu stry 11 , Econ omic Deve lopm
ent and Cult ural .fj1a_n~ (Janu ary 1%7 ),
P• 209.

3
Pric es:

Step hen R. Lewi s, Jro, "Eff ects of Trad
e Polic y on Dom estic Rela tive
Paki stan, 1951 -196 5", AER (Marc h 1968 ),
Tc:bl e I.

--11Clearl y such a system soon begins to have its own life and
become s
increa singly diffic ult to abando n.

On the one hand} the indus trial impor ting

intere sts become more and mor-e entren ched .and used to making
large windf all
profit s..

Secon dly, not only does the civil servic e have absolu te power
under

such a disequ ilibriu m system ., but it is able to substa ntiall
y supple ment its
income as

.:'ll!!2.

~

payme nts are requir ed to grease the ,vheels

of

progre ss.

Thirdl y, the emotio nal residu e of the reject ion of the privat
e enterp rise
comm ercial• coloni al packag e contin ues in most cases to have
a strang lehold
on the countr y, and any govern ment will contin ue· to have
to be very carefu l
to avoid the accusa tion that it is about to "give away"
the countr y I s re~

source s once again.,

There also remain the genera lized Prebis h-type fears

that partic ipatio n in the world ecoho!To/ is bound to work
to the disadv antage
of the indivi dual LDC and that it theref ore must protec t
itself via unusua l
method s of insula tion and au·tark y.
Finall y, . there exist hone~ t concer ns about the dissip ation
of re··
source s if the contro l system were ever .to be disman tled$

Once contro ls have

been instit uted and new ones added on top of old ones it
become s increa singly
diffic ult for govern ments- -even those with the best intent
ions-- -to know just· ·
what ,rnul<l happen if parts of the struct ure are disman tled.,

There then appear

real fears of the _deluge_, _with .respe ct. to..bot h foreig n and
domes tic re
-S{lurc-es, .once the gates· ar·e opened to the pressu r-e.s. of the
market place.,
Even though effici ency may not be at its highe st, there is
a very strong
belie f that_ only as long as there are direct contro ls can
the govern ment in
effect be sure it knows the claims on its foreig n exchan ge
and_bu dgetar y
resour ces

and can deal i11ith them effec" tively .

-12In short, argum ents for a revers al of the polici es of the
i1nme·~
diate post-w ar need to be strong enough to overco me substa
ntial resist ance.
Such a revers al does not, in fact., have a chance unless
and until the govexn 
ment concer ned and those aiding it from abroad --beco me compl
etely aware of
the· high cost-- in terms of growth forego ne--of presen t po
lie ies.
Such an awaren ess has made impor tant stride s in the less
develo ped
world during the past half a dozen years or so.

Policy makers have been

forced to note tbat per capita income growth in the LDC's
as a whole de
clined from a rate of 2o5 per cent during 1950-5 5 to 1.8
per cent in

1955· 60, ivhile export s declin ed from a fi.• 2 per cent to a 2.
9 per cent annual
4

rate.

They have ]?een forced to conclu de that the dynam ic change
s expect ed

from a forced draft indus trializ ation progra m remain ed on
the horizo n while
agricu lture langui shed and unemp loymen t and undere mploym
ent mounte d.
creasi ngly theref ore) two views are now being heard:

In

one, that the

"cheap 11 import substi tution possi bilitie s have now been
exhau sted and that
the LDC must turn to e2;port promo tion instea d; and second
, that the pro
blem of substa ntiall y increa sing agricu ltural output must
be faced direct ly
and soone

In other words, the conve ntiona l wisdom about .the mainsp
rings

of growth is underg oing gradua l amendm ent., and it is recogn
ized that polici es
must be altere d accord ingly.
More specif ically ., the realiz ation has gradu ally taken hold
that
the first restru cturin g strate gy was substa ntiall y in error
and, in fact,
seriou sly impair ed LDC perfor mance , precis ely becaus e it
failed to set as
its goal the mobil izatio n of the whole LDC econom y.

The govern ment must

still try to tap the colon ial flows and reorie nt them; but
there are

altern ative ways of doing so., namely by involv ing the usuall
y prepon derant
agricu ltural hinter land and encour aging its mutual " intera
ction and

11

conne cted

ness11 with a more decen tralize d and rural- orient ed indus
trial sector •

.

Facili tating access to resour ces for -medium and small~ scale
indus trial entrepreneu rs

provid es not only a chance for more effici ent produ ction
for the

domes tic marke t but additi onaJ major flexib ility for the
explo ration of new
export market so
In short, there is a growin g appre ciatio n that the contro
lled econom y
syndro me of overva lued exchan ge rates, import contro ls and
a highly
differ entiat ed credit market ., all geared to favori ng public
as well as
large- scale privat e,, impor t··subs tittitin g indust ries., has
tended t.o lose for
the LDC the chance to harnes s most of its econom ic agents
to the develo pment
effort .

If the scarce energi es of offici~ ldom can be freed from
patchi ng

up an ever more cumber some and compl icated contro l system
and the undou btedly
even more precio us privat e energi es from the game of _avoid
ing or evadin g
these same contro ls., the most viciou s of the LDC viciou s
cycles , that of the
self-f ulfill ing prophe cy of the "absen t entrep reneur " forcin
g an active
govern ment to do ever more, can be avoide d~

This means that while govern ment

must remain at center stageJ the large suppo rting cast which
is necess ary,
can no longer be neglec ted.

The first restru cturin g effort has beeri sub"'

stanti ally in error precis ely becaus e it failed to set as
its goal the
mobil izatio n of the entire economy~

-14-

Perhaps the most remarkable change in the less developed world
since World War II has been a growing realization of these facts and sub
sequent attempts to rethink the method by which governments can better
induce socially desirable actions by the private sector.

The ~11 1;ndustriali za

tion· first strategy has been shown to be costly and inefficient ; starving·
the peasant and the industrial entrepreneu r has led to starving the growth
of the economy as a whole.,

vJhile the restructurin g of the colonial pattern

remains a major objective,, more and more attention is now being paid not
only to the improved allocation of the imported resources purchased with
traditional exports--an d supplemente d by foreign aid--but also to these
quaLi_tative aspects involving the incentives and e~1ergies of the economy 1 s
decision-ma kers,. public and private.
Clearly most LDC' s cannot afford a sufficientl y large development
effort to be willing or able to disregard a low quality of effort.
sets them off from the Soviets

who,

This

incidentall y, are also beginning to feel

the need to trade quantity for quality.

The growing realization that success

ful development may require a different kind of restructurin g usually comes
down to a 'Switch in policies by which the government tries to affect private

-15sector action so

If agricu lture and medium and small- scale indust ry are to

be mobili zed this cannot be done effect ively either via
direct govern ment
owner ship or direct contro ls over resour ce alloca tion~ -if
for no other reason
than the sheer phys:t cal impos sibilit y of reachi ng the. millio
ns of actors
concer nedo

As a conseq uence, mobil izatio n via polici es which work increa
singly .

throug h the market are gradu ally coming into vogueo

This means that the

cataly tic role of govern ment rather than the direct resour
ces augme ntation
and reallo cation role of govern ment-- as well as that of
its foreig n assist ance
supple ment-- must come into the spotli ght.
That is perhap s the single most impor tant lesson we have
learne d.,
While all societ ies share the proble m of organi zing themse
lves effect ively
to marsh all the resour ces under their sway for commo nly
agreed on purpo ses,
the less develo ped count ries, in partic ular, need to broade
n the base on which
produ ctive and innova tive activi ties are carrie d on; this
requir es an openin g
up of their system s to a larger volume of decisio n-mak ing
by hither to neg
lected or econom ically disenf ranchi sed segmen ts of the popula
tionc

Method s

somehow have to be found to spread domes tic and foreig n
capita l more broadl y
among decisi on-ma king units.,

Such a strate gy has to be based in the first

instan ce on an unders tandin g ·of -how a given system perfor
ms ideall y and,
second ly on what policy change s in each sector --and in terms
of the inter
action among sector s--are requir ed to achiev e a better approx
imatio n to that
idea 1~
This paper intend s to analyz e in somew hat greate r detail
this second
post-W orld War II restru cturin g effort , espec ially with
respec t to the for
eign t1·ade sector .

It is well recogn ized that any libera lizati on or openin g

up of the whole econorrry to broade r partic ipatio n throug
h the market mechan ism

requir es policy change s in a number of linked and interrelate d sector s.

-16-

The market for credit ., for examp le, is closel y linked , i.e., comple
mentar y
to the foreig n exchan ge market o

Howev er, while we clearl y should not be

doctri naire about which partic ular sector is likely to be
"the" bottle neck
sector in impedi ng progre ss, the foreig n trade sector is
inevit ably high on
the priori ty list, partly becaus e foreig n trade often plays
a substa ntial
role (up to 25% ·of gross domes tic produ ct) and partly ., and
more impor tantly ,
becaus e even in the large domes tically orient ed econom ies,
such as India,
trade may provid e a very impor tant elemen t of residu al flexib
ility for a very
tightl y constr ained econom ic system ..

Moreo ver, it can be said with some

assura nce, that the distor tions brough t about by misdir ected,
if well inten-

.

.

tioned ., govern ment contro l pol:i.c ies, are us:uall y most flagra
nt here and make
a major contri bution to the typica l landsc ape descri bed
above ..

It is, in

any case, an empir ical fact that real world libera lizati
on effort s in the
LDC I s have custom arily been approa ched seque ntially , sector
by sector , with
foreig n trade- -the sector which usuall y

11

pinche s 11 the most·· -invar iably re-

ceivin g early attent ion. While the realiz ation that a second restru cturin g is requir
ed to im
prove perfor mance must be reache d by LDC govern ments thems
elves, foreig n aid·
can and does help.

If aid- donors and at least certa~ n segme nts -of ai1 -aid - re

cipien t's bureau cracy are in agreem ent on the substa nce
of the argum ent,

.

e.g., that a more br.oadl y based partic ipatio n in-dev elopm
ent is necess ary,
and specif ically ., that libera lizati on of the foreig n trade
sect.or would be a
substa ntial move in that direct ion, the basis for the requir
ed second re
struct uring can more easily be laid.

The abilit y to persua de the rest of the

decisio n-mak ing machi nery-- on both sides• •-to make those
change s may then
prove the differ ence.

Just as clearl y, imposi ng a condi tion on aid withou t

such full prior. unders tandin g and agreem ent on what needs
to be done to

serv e the reci pien t's own deve lopm ent •inte
rests is not only prec ariou s but

I

almo st sure to fail. ,
/

Ther e are, of cour se, thos e who say that even
such· · pers uasio n vers es
on inter vent ion in the recip ient coun try I
s inter nal. affai r.so

But unw illin g

ness to inter vene in beha lf of polic y chan
ges whic h are mutu ally agre ed on as
desi rable at the tech nica l leve l cons titut
es -inte rven tion on beha lf of the
statu s quo. It is not in the inte rest of
the taxp ayer s of eith er the dono r
or the recip ient coun try to cont inue to finan
ce a .~eve lopm ent prog ram whos e
effe ctive ness is so circu mscr ibed that its
ultim ate succ ess is serio usly in•
doub to
Fore ign aid can play three dist inct , if rela
ted, role s in this cont ext.
In the first insta nce, a cert ain volum e of
aid is often requ ired in the poli tica l
sens e. to perm it a free and open disc ussio
n of chan ges in LDC gove rnme nt poli cies ,
for exam ple, in the forei gn trade sect or.
With out such an earn est of one's
inten tion s to part icip ate in the finan cing
of the over all deve lopm ent progr am,
it is diffi cult · to raise quest ion_s wl.th the
recip ient on matt ers of over all
gover .nmen t polic y. A secon d use of aid may
be in the cont ext of a more
spec ific tech nica l assis tanc e or capi tal
proje cto

For· eJcar nple, an econo mic

advi sory team to help deter mine the prec
ise natu re of the polic y chan ges
requi red_, or the crea tion of such fina ncia
l inter med iarie s as deve lopm ent
banJ.cs, repr esen t exam ples of the bring ing
to bear of reso urce s to addr ess
spec ific bot:t lenec ks cin

a

secto r-by -sec tor basi s, as nece ssary to imple
ment

any agre ed-o n restr uctu ring strat egyo
In the third insta nce, aid can serv e a very
impo rtant role in putti ng
to rest , or at leas t allay ing, the fears
of. thos e who worr y abou t the reso urce
diss ipati on whic h migh t resu lt from a libe
raliz atio n pack age.

Clea rly, the

v,olume of reso urce s requ ired for this third
purp ose cloes n' t real ly have to 'be

-18addit ive to the aid neede d to get a seat at the discu
ssion table ; but the
purpo ses are somew hat diffe rent, i.e., to provi de
the assura nce that if
there are short falls to tarif f reven ue or if foreig
n excha nge reser ves are
thr.ea tened by liber aliza tion, addit ional aid will
be avail able to serve as a
shock absor ber.

These fears may., in fact, be large ly psych ologi cal
since ,

in the textbo ok sense , the adopt ion of any pa.rti cular
polic y packa ge, s.:iy a
shift from quan titati ve restri ction s· to tarif fs,· does
not have to imply a
large r volum e of :lmpo rts; nor does any parti cular
chang e in struc ture have
to imply a lower tax take.,

But there clear ly exist real proble ms of timin g

and adjus tment and, perha ps even more impo rtantl y,
of reass uranc e for those
who are taki·h g the p0Ut ical risks inher ent in makin
g such chang es.
In this fash:i. on less devel oped count ries have incre
asing ly come to
trie realiz ation , partly on their own and partl y with
the help of foreig n ex
perts. , that a chang e in polic y towar ds their .forei
gn trade secto r is . neede d
to impro ve the quali ty of their growt h perfor mance
.

The quest ion of what

parti cular kind of polic y packa ge makes sense in
any parti cular count ry
situa tion, to effec t the neces sary secon d restru cturin
g still needs to be
exami ned ..

ill
In recen t years impor t libere .lizat ion has playe d an
incre asing ly importa nt role j_n the attem pt to rever se the disto rtion
s of past impor t subs't i
tutio n polic ies and to reintr oduce some (but not
all) of the disca rded class i
cal comp etitiv e eleme nts into the devel oping econom
y.

Most often , this is

linke d with movem ent towan 1s a more reali stic excha
nge rate eithe r via a
~

.it.!!.~

or a de - ~ deval uatio n and (poss ibly) addit ional
effor t .towa rds

-J.9~
direct export promot ion.

We will be concern ed here mainly with the import

libera lizatio n phenom enon•-•- though we recogn ize that the last word
has by no
means been said on the issue of devalu ations proceed ing from an
initia l

.
·1·b
·
d isequi
1 rium
posi·t·ion. l
One crucia l issuew hich clearly needs to be address ed at an early
stage is the relevan t defini tion of import liberal ization .,

It is quite clear

from the sparse literat ure on-the subject -··main ly confine d t'o governm
ent re
ports and foreign aid analys es--tha t there exists a good deal of
confus ion
about the precise meaning of the term.

Many less develop ed countr ies think

of import liberal ization as simply "more import s".

Recogn izing that excess

capaci ty constit utes a was·te of resourc e.s--as well as that more
planned im.-•
ports may simply imply more foreign assista nce--im port liberal ization
is
often underst ood as more "libera l" import quota allocat ions of raw
materi als
and spare parts to come closer to filling existin g capaci ty.

Ciearly ,

~ , any industr y operati ng substa ntially below capaci
ty is lil~ely
I

I

to be a very high cost indust ry; the enhance d ability - to bring capaci
ty up to
more norma 1 levels will reduce unit costs and pC2rmit more of the
existin g in
dustria l structu re to become an efficie nt contrib utor to the econom
y.
should be noted, howeve r, that initial "wrong" decisio ns

0~1

It

inc_lust:r:y produc t

mb~es and technol ogy are not necess arily solved by more generou s
curren t
import allocat ions.

If import liberal ization ~eans nothing more than adding

more wine to leaky bottles this may not be the most effecti ve way
of in-

'

creasin g the compet itivene ss and efficie ncy of the develop ing econom
y.

1

see c. P. Kindle berger, "Liber al Policie s vs. Contro ls in the For-·
eign Trade of Develo ping Countr ies", AID Discus sion Paper if:lt.f,
Office of
Program Coordi nation, AID, April, 1967, for a beginn inz.

-20A second definitio n of import liberaliz ation goes beyond the mere
notioJ1 of "more imports" by emphasizi ng the partial dismantli ng of import con
trols either via a broadenin g of quotas or even permittin g all comers to compete for raw material and spare part requireme nts on an open general license
(cx;L) basis.

In other words, beyond assuring establish ed firms

a

larger

volume of raw materials and spare parts they are given more flexibili ty
as to -what precisely to procure ·within broad categorie s.,

If nex, industrie s

and unlicense d importers are permitted to partici.pa te, this has addi.tiona l
benefits_ in letting the more efficient · industrie s within the existing indus
tria 1 complex obtain bottlenec k current import requireme nts, and thus intro
duces

an

important competiti ve pressure into the industria l hothouse.

This

. means that among the (typically ) several hundred licensed importers and among
the existing large scale claimants to industria l licenses, market pressures
begin to have an increasin g

11

bite 11 and the incentive s for enhancing efficienc y

begin to make themselve s felt.
This is about as for as mos.t of the developin g countries would
initially like to go&

Even if there exists a certain convictio n on the merits

of competiti ve pressures , it seldom extends to countenai1 cing any real threat
to the eJcisting industria l structure from new investors ; thus it is only at
the final stage that most are willing to permit a ·dismantl ing of controls with
respect to capital imports, along with ra,v materials and spare parts.

of course, means that

we

This,

0

usually do not easily get the desirable access

potential new entrepren eurs who want to "build a better mousetrap ".

0

,:
J...

In som'e

cases, this unwilling ness to permit capital goods to be imported on a com
petitive basis, with all comers large or small, new or old, par_ticipa ting,
reflects the civil service's usual notion that

II

liberaliz ation is fine but

we. must be in a position to confine it to the. 1 priority I industrie s".·

In

other words, lip service is paid to the notion of enhancing the scope of the
market mechanism in allocating resources~, while great care is taken to ensure
that none of the existing industries is, in fact, hurt.

There are many in·•

stances, as a consequence. ., in which the expansion of CGL and free lists is
accompanied by a growing ban list to provide absolute protection for in
dustries in which injury can be claimed as a consequence of the importation
bf a specific type of capital or consumer good.
In the next sestion we expect to analyze the experience in a number
of specific aid recipient developing countries which have attempted some im
port liberalizati on.

1i7hile

there are many LDC I s which have experienced de

valuation there are. still only a few even partly documented cases of. full
devaluation /liberalizat ion packages.

One reason for this is the difficulty

of establishi.n g whether and hmi much liberalizat ion has, in fact, occurrede
The usual way of nscertainini ; ,,Jhether quantitativ e controls are being more or
less restrictive is for the investigato r to get the

11

£eel 11 of the situation

by talking to businessmen and officials,_ but this approach is not terribly

objective~

A theoretical ly preforable way is to measure the discrepancy

between domestic rr.,nket prices of importables and the c. i •. f. plus tariff price;
any discrepancy can be attributed to the check on imports imposed by the
quantitativ e restriction s.

This approach has the obvious difficulty of re

quiring reliable price data.
While it would clearly be helpful to have unambiguous criteria foT
measuring the success or failure of such
countries,

restructurin g efforts in different

the literature provides little help for assessing an LOC de

valuation which is accorr.panied by
flow of foreign capita 1~

11

trade liberalizati on" and/or a large in

J:n theory such a devaluation might not lead to any
1,?

increase in the general price level even in the short run for three reasons:

-22(1)

the inflow of extra capital will permit a larger volume of imports

thus offsetti ng the initial increase in price· and .(2) even if the volume 0£
imports does not immedia tely increase , domesti c-prices need not rise if de
control of imports accompa nies the devalua tion because the increase in the
c., i. f., prices of imports simply elimina tes some of the importe rs I monopoly
profits. ,

(3)

The economy will operate more efficien tly and so produce more

goods with a fixed volume of resourc es; with money supply and velocity constant, prices may fall~ 1

Besides looking at price changes, another criterio n

might be the extent to which excess capacity is reducedG
is the extent to which exports rise.
rate

as

A third criterio n

A fourth might be changes in the saving

fiscal charges replace quantita tive controls on imports and

incentiv es for small and medium scale private savings are affected .
berger

2

Kindle-

has suggeste d tl-1ree precond itions_ for a success ful devalua tion/

liberali zation package:

(i)

an elastic supply of foodstu ffs, i.e., a good

harvest_ . - (ii) a~ elastic short-ru n supply of imported raw materia ls so that
I

output- -especia lly of export goods--c an rapidly expand, and (iii) a politica
l
consensu s that the pol:i.cy package is a wise one·.

This last factor might

be measured by the change in money ·wage rates follouin g adoption of the
package .
Even if most people agreed that a devalua tion/lib eralizat ion would
make a system economi cally better off at some ·distant point in the future
than it would otherwis e have been~ it is, of course, also helpful to know
how long the transiti on will take and what the immedia te consequ ences ,vi 11'
be.

1

E. Sot1men> "The Effect of Devalua tion on the Price Level", QJE

(May 1958), pp. 273-283.

2
Kindleb erger, .QQ•

ill•

The country cases examined were chosen with the hope of illuminating some
/

what the preconditions ior success, the measurerneni of success, and the
nature of the normal transition to an improved situation.
IV

A.

Pakistan

I

In Pakistan, imports account for about 12 per cent of GNP and exports
for about 6 per cent.

In 1959 the Government of Pakistan (GOP) began liber

alizing its import system by allowing exporters (or somebody to whom they
sold the export bonus voucher) to import an amount equal to a certain fraction
of their non-traditional (cotton and jute) export earnings (depending on the
type of expArt); the Export Bonus Voucher could be used to import any good
on a specified bonus list.

By 1963. imports under this scheme amounted to

about 7 per cent of total private sector imports (which in turn constituted
_about 70 per cent of total i_mports).

In mid-1960, an additional Open General

License was intr9duced which allowed newcomers to import for the first time
and a system of "repeat licensing" was instituted, with import licenses being
automatically replenished upon proof of utilization of the initial quantities
(otherwise importers had to ·wait until the next six-montl::.s I licensing period
began in order to get additional impC1rts).

By the end of 1963 imports entering

under the Open General License accounted for another llr per cent of total pri-

.
1
va t e imports.

Thus,

97

1963 about 15 per cent of total imports had been

libera lizede
- In January 1964 four major iron and steel items were placed on a
so-called "free list" (i.e., completely unrestricted imports) and another
50 items were added in July, 1964,

1

By- the end of 1964 such free list items

Philip Thomas, 11 Import Licensing and Import Liberalization in Pakistan,
A Critical Evaluation" (mimeo, Dec. 1965), p. 78. The clbove description of
Pakistan's licensing system draws heavily on Thomas I work.

i

I
f

t

accou nted for 26 per cent of total impor ts and for
the bulk·· of impor ted raw
mater ials,.

As goods were place d on the free list, relev ant
tariff s an<l other

fisca l charg es were incre ased by an avera ge of 13
per cent.
Hith more than

l.;.Q

per cent of total :Lmpo rts liber alize d in one way

or anoth er, and foreig n assis tance level s simul taneo usly incre
ased by
subst antia l amoun ts, the annua l level of impor t·s
almos t triple d betwe en 1S59

and 1%4.,

As a conse quenc e, the amouri t of singl e sbift capac
ity in use

(based on a surve y of 65 plant s) rose from 53 per
cent in the secon d half
of 1963 to 76 per cent in the secon d half of 196l:.
and to 82 per cent i.n t}1e
first quart er of 1965; 1 indus tri2.l produ ction rose
by 12 per cent (seas onall y
adjus ted>2 from the third quart er of 1963 to the
first quart er of 19650 3
Perha ps the most notab le e2rnmp le of the impro ved
resou rce alloca t:ton
att;ri butab le to the impor t liber aliza tion that began
in 1S59 was the drama tic
rise in priva te tube\• Jell insta llatio ns in West Palds
tane

Altho ugh unfor eseen in

gover nment pla:ns , . 32,00 0 such tubew ells had been
inst<: 1lled by 1965.

Hhile neces 

sary' purnps are produ ced dome stical ly, by relat ively
small engin eering firms ,
they use impor ted pig iron, which was not obtai nable
in the absen ce of impor t
liber aliza tion.

This liber aliza tion coinc ided with the eover nment I
s with-

drawa l after 1960 from massi ve ir,ter venti on in "the
major food crop marke ts
perm itting price s to rise, and
stabi lizati on progra m.

conte nting

itsel f with a buffe r stock

With minim um price s guara nteed to produ cer and price

ceilin gs maint ained vi.a the :Lnfus ion of P. L. 4-80
stock s into the marke t,

1

Based on an A.I.D . surve y cited in paper by Walte
r P. Falco n and
Steph en R., Lewi s; Jr., "Econ omic Polic y in Pakis
tan I s Secon d Plan" , (mime o,
Nov. 1966) , p. 13.

2
All seaso nal adjus tment s in this paper were done by
A. I. D. in the
summe r of 1967.
3
The unadj usted incre ase in indus trial produ ction was
also 12 per cent
during the perio d.

the incenti ves were

11

right" for tubewe lls to be install ed) other crop practic es

to be improve d and substa ntial increas es in agricu ltural produc tivity
to be
registe red.

Falcon and Gotsch estima te

that ''privat e tubewe lls accoun ted

for about one-fo urth of the total 27 per cent increas e in the value
of crop
output" 1 between 1960/61 and 196l}/6 5. Later on the new 11 mirac le"
seed
varieti es (Mexlca n wheat and IRRI rice) became more importa nte
sequenc e of all this, foodgra in

As a con

produc tion which had been growing at 1 per

cent annual ly in 1950-60 spurted to 3~ 9 per cent annual ly during

1

60-65

with rates near 5 per cent obtaine d in more recent years.
Moreov er the fillip provide d by indust ries ancilla ry. to pump pro
duction_ , coupled with the substa ntial rise in agricu ltura 1 produc tivity.,
re
sulted in a genera l mushroo ming .of small- scale industr y in the Punjab
.

In

the small town of Daska, Hest Pakista n,. for exampl e, 11here there had
existed
hardly any machine tool activit ies in 1961, by mid-196 5 there tiere
120

i

machine shops produc ing diesel engines for tubewe ll constru ction.

The change,

in aggreg ative terms) of Pakista ni perform ance, from neglig ible per
capita
income increas es in the late 50 1 s to increas es in the neighbo rhood
of 3 per_
cent recentl y (in spite of drough t and war) is quite remark ab1e.

_AdmUt edly.,

the Pakista n success cannot be laid simply at the doorste p of liberal
ization ,
There was the major contrib ution of liberali zat:{.o n in other sectors
;
expeci ally agricu lture, which not only kept inflati onary pressu res
in check
I

but, for the first time, helped mobiliz e the agricu ltural surplus
for domest ic
develop mento

In fact, import liberal ization > while import ant in giving ·the

¾falter Pa Falcon and Carl H. Gotsch , "Agric ultural Develop ment in
Pakista n: Lesson s from the Second .-Plan Period" (June 1%6,. mimeo)
p. it;.
While other policie s made tubewe lls proHta ble, import liberal ization
made
them possibl eo

-26systiem an initial shove., was not sustained long enough to cause a major re
structuring of the economy.

As Mason cone ludes

11

the immediate consequence s

.of the 1964 actions on industrial output in Pakistan were much more the
res.ult of the increase in the level of commodity imports than of any change
in their allocationQ

Given time., the abandonment of licensing procedures

would no doubt have brought market forces more effectively into play.

As

events conspired, however., the trade liberalizati on measures were one of
the casualties of the Inda-Pakist an conflict". 1

Nevertheles s, once liberali

zation had started it achieved its own forward ,momentum.
stantially stimulated; while

E:itports were sub··

traditional raw jute and cotton exports rose

by 21 per cent between 1959 and 1964, exports of non-traditio nal commodities
rose by 89 per cent, accounting fqr about 60 per cent of the total by 1964.
The effects of initial ·liberalizat ion by way of helping to make possible
the near tripling of the agricultura l growth rate and by opentng up new
windows to farmers via non-agricul tural investment opportuniti es and in
centive consumer goods cannot easily be overstatedg

Once the mutually

interacting
processes had been started the economy I s momentum has thus far
I
proved sufficient to overcome the impact of bad monsoons, war with India
and curtailment of foreign assistance.

l'j
1
Edward S. Mason, ].co.nomj_s Pe.ve)9,2m~nt_ i r l _ _ . I n d i ~ ~
(Harvard, Center for Int 1 1 Affairs, September, 1966)., p. li-5.
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Imports account for only about 7 per cent. of Indian GNP and exports
for about 4 per cent.

In June 1966 India devalued its currency by 58 per

cent (from L}o76 rupees per dollar to 7.50 rupees per dollar).

At the sart1e

time selective tariffs were reduced by varying amounts so that one observer
estimates that the c.iofo plus tariff rupee price of some imports immediately
rose by as little as 34 per cento

1

On.the export side the Government of India

(GOI) accompanied the devaluation with the imposition of export taxes and the
abolition of all export ::;ubsidies on sorr,e of the traditionnl exports; s~

th;t

jute manufactures, for example, received a new effective exchange rate only

16 per cent higher than· the old one.

For non-traditiona l manufactured e,~

port items, the GOI abolished one kind of export subsidy (import entitlements)
and.introduced in their stead-~with some delay--three categories of straight
cash subsidies so that the new effective exchan&e rate increased from 11 per
cent (for an item that formerly got a 7 5 per cent import entitlement and now
has a 10 per cent cash subsidy) to 6L,, per cent (for an item that formerly got
2
a 20 per cent import entitlement and now has a 20 per cent cash subsidy)e
Along with the de jure devaluation, the tariff changes, the imposition
of export taxes, and changes in the form and amount of export subsidies, the
Indian Government introduced an import liberalization scheme for 59 industries,
covering about 70 per cent of the output of the "organized" industrial sector.
In these 59 industries import licenses were to be issued "freely" for raw
materials and spare parts a

Moreover, six raw materials \}ere placed on "open'

general license", with no restrictions on the amount that could be imported.

1
Philip s. Thomas, '.'The 1%6 Devaluation and Import Liberalization
in India" (December 1966, mimeo), Tab le J,,
2

Ibi.9.., Table 2o These effective exchange rates do not take into account
the increase in production costs resulting from the higher ·price of Indian
imports. For example_, the jute industry ,Jas granted a subsidy on imported
raw jute following devaluatione

-28This package seems to have had several objectiv es:
previous export subsidy scheme,

(1) to simpl:i.fy the

(2) to simplify -the import control system,

(3) to raise the Cai. f., plus tariff price of imports and then allow the mar
ket place an increasi ng role in determin ing the composi tion of certain kinds
of imports. , and (4) to enhance the profita bility of e::-~ports vso import- s,ub..
stitutes o
Based on a survey of· 140 industri es, one study estimate d that in 196l}

Indian industry was running at about 82 per cent of "desirab le" output~ 1
Bl!,t this average figure is heavily .influenc ed by textiles ., basil:: metals,
and

food and tobacco which account for about 70 per cent of manufac turing value
added and were operatin g at over -35 per cent of desirab le output in 196L:-o
Several other industri es ,·iere running at much lower levels of "desirab le"
output in 1964:

chemica ls - l}5%; metal products - L:-6%; electric al machine ry -

58%; other machine ry - 63%; and transpo rt equipme nt - 6l}%~ 2

Firms suggeste d

three princip al reasons why they were operatin g at such low levels of capacity
~
shortage and poor quality of raw materia ls, shortage of· imports, and labor
3
problems .,
Unfortu nately the response of the Indian economy to the devalua tion/
liberali zation package cannot be separate d from the exogenou s- impact of two
consecu tive bad monsoons ~

For eJrnmple , preliinin ary data suggest that total

Indian e:;(ports for the twelve months endins August 31, 1967 were 5 per cent
below exports of the precedin g twelv,e months.,

The entire decline of $76

million can be accounte d for by the drop in exports of "agricu ltural based"

1

Nationa l Council of Applied Economic Researc h, Y.!J-9!:L.:JI!:_iliES_iQ.n_ Q.f ·
-1.!l1-ust.EJ.§~~.§l£..Lt..Y (Neu Delhi) 1965), p. 8. "Desira ble" is based on a judg
ment of which industri es it would be technic ally feasible to run two or three
shifts.

2_lli._<l~, pp. 53~5l:-.,
3

Ibida, pp. tf4-L:-9.

-29commodities (jute goods, teal cotton textiles, oilseeds, cashew nuts, tobacco,
coffee, sugar, and raw cotton).,

The index of manufacturi ng output was only

2 per cent above its June 1966 level by June 1967.

This failure of manu

facturing output to respond to the devaluatio. n/liberaliza tion policies is
again mainly due to the agricultura l failure (it should be recalled that
agriculture accounts for about half of Indian net domestic product).

Agri

cultural failure affected manufacturi ng both via the supply of raw materials.
for the textile and food industries and via the provision of the required
savings, on the one hand., and markets, on the oc.her, for all industries.
The initial policy changes cited were considered to be part of a
two-year program by the end of which a 11 quantitativ e restriction s in
cluding on capital goods, and excepting only luxuries, were to have been
removed.,

None of the remaining steps has as yet been taken.

Indeed, in

the fall of 1966, in partial comp_ensatio n for doing away with the "indigenous
angle clearance" system; the so··called ban !:lJ'.: prohibited list of imports was
expandedo

From a fairly stable performance in the ear1y 1960 1 s (i.e.,

advances of 3o 5 per cent per yea::::-) the wholesale price index rose by- 17 per
cent in 1964., 7 per cent in 1965, ll~ per cent in 1966, and another 14 per
cent in 1967.

It is, however, he}.:_:i:'.:·.11

to isolate agricultura l prices if

one is to judge the erfe'ct of the 1966 package.

Between June 1966 and June

1967 wholesale prices rose by 13 per cent, as compared to 18 per cent during
the 12 monthso

While wholesale food prices rose by 26 per cent in this period

(as compared to only 19 per cent in the preceding twelve months), wholesale
prices of industrial raw materials rose by only- 2 per cent in the year after
.devaluation (as compared to 29 per cent in t:he year preceding devaluation ).
The wholesale price index for manufacture s rose by ,\ per cent in the year
after devaluation as compared

to an 11 per cent increase in the year before

I

i

I

-30deval uatio n.

So it would seem that deval uation --acco mpan ied by
parti al
\the•
liber aliza tion andY virtua L · doubl ing of comm odity
aid~-c lid not lead to marke dly
highe r price s; in fact, given the accid ent of bad
monso ons, it seems likely
that tbe polic y packa ge proba bly preve nted more subst
antia l infla tiona ry
press ures.

It remai ns to be seen wheth er the India n elect orate
and India n

policy -mal:e rs will reach the same concl usion or ·wheth
er they will be blind ed
by the accel eratio n in the level of food price s.

The under lying favor able

struc tural chang es of the 1%6 polic y packa ge were
thus virtu ally comp letely
"mask ed" by the happe nstan ce of bad weath er.
from C9 millio n metri c tons in 61-:-/65·

Foodg rain produ ction declin ed

to 72 millio n tons in 65/66 .

The

curre nt (1963) ·whea t crop, on the other hand, is
expec ted to be more than 100
millio n metri c tons, consi derab ly above the histo
rical trendo

It seems

clea_r that "if tbe momentum achie ved in agric ultur
e and foreig n excha nge
polic y can be susta ined, and if aid contin ues a~
least at the level s of the
recen t past then, provi ded the monso ons retur n to
norraa l, near term Indie n
, econo mic proje cts are far brigh ter than indic ated
by recen t perfo rmanc e". 1

c.

,9..Q].pmb:1&
Colom bian impor ts amoun t to rough ly 12 per cent of
GNP and expor ts

to about 10 per cent.

In Septe mber 1965, Colom bia, a multi ple excha nge
rate

count ry, deval ued the excha nge rate relev ant for
about 7 5 per cent of her
impor ts by 50 per cent (from 9 to 13. 5 pesos per
doJ.la ,:), and agreec t to place

at least half of a 11 impor ts on an autom atic licen se list
withi n six month s '
1

Kenne th Kaufm an, "Tl'.e Indi.a n Econo my:
Near Term Prosp ects" (1'1arch 1%7, mimeo )~

Some Recen t Histo ry and

"'

-31and 85 per cent of all imports withi.~ 14 monthsc 1

In October 1%5 about

20 per cent of total import licenses covered goods on the free list; by
Septemb er 1966 this had increase d to about 80 per _cent of total imports --all
at the new rate of 13o5 pesos/d ollar..

The combina tion of higher tariff rates

and the increase d peso costs of given ad valorem tariffs (as the import e;:
change rate deprecia ted) led to an increase in (nomina l) tariffs of over
~

21 per-cen t in 1966.

The initiall y higher nominal exchange rate for "minor

exports" (everyth ing except coffee and petroleu m) did not change._
The response of the Colombi an rconomy to these new poli~ies coupled
with generous new aid allocati. ons during this fourteen -month period is not
unambig uously clear.

The monthly level

of

imports rose from $35 million in

Septemb er 1965 to $71 million in March 1966 (season ally adjusted ) and then
fluctuat ed through Novembe r 1966 at a level of about $55 million per mont:.-:.
Total arrivals (seasona lly adjusted ) were $7i:.3 million in the fourteen months
after Septemb er 1965 as compared to $598 million in the fourteen months before
Septemb er 1965.
While prices of importa bles did not increase markedl y, the consume r
(workers •) price index rose by 19 per cent (seasona lly adjusted ) between
Septemb er 1965 and Novembe r 1966, as_ compared to 7 per cent in- t-he preceding-------

14- month.so

Food prices rose by 19 per cent (seasona lly adjusted ) in the· lt}

months after Septem~ er 1965 as compare d to
ceding Septemb er 19650

l}

per- cent in the 14 months pre

The rate of, inflatio n clearly accelera ted in the

period after the new devalua tion/lib eralizat ion policies were initiate d. 2
1

The liberali zation percenta ges used in this section exclude imports
which are financed by foreign credits for specific project s; such ''non
reimbur sable" imports account for about 10--15 per cent of the total impo:rtse
2

l'he ·wholesa le price index ·rose by 17 percent (season ally adjusted )
in the fourteen months after Septemb er 1965 as compared to 10 per cent in
the li:. precedin g months ..

-32One major contribu ting reason was the .J.ag i.n agricul tural output, which grew
by -~ess than 2 per cent in 1%5, as compared to more than 5 per cent in both

196l, and 19660

This failure to simultan eously stir the agricult ura 1 sector

into forward motion was undoubt edly decisive in renderin g the relat:i.v ely
meager results of the policy package that was adopted, ,

For one thing..,

devalua tion affected the minor exports unfav0r ably, iee., they rose by 3
per cent in 1966, as compared to a 40 per cent increase between 196li- and
1965.,

One might have predicte d this slow growth.., since the effectiv e ex•~

change rate for imports had depJ:eci ated substan tially while the nominal ex-.
Change rate for minor exports had remained at ·13., 5 pesos since May 1965. 1
Secondly , there was

a simultan eous effort to change the price relation ship

between agricult ure and non-agr iculture domesti callyo

As a conseque nce

with the money supply expandin g a·t about the same rate as before (16% over
ll:. months) prices rose more rapidly and, as one might expect, the aggrega
tive

performa nce of real output ·was not signific antly stimula ted. · Colombia has
no publishe d industr ial producti< ;m index.

Seasona lly adjusted cement pro

duction declined by l~ per cent in the 11'.} months after Septemb er 1965, as
compared to an increase of 7 per cent in the precedin g ll:. months.

Seasona lly

adjusted electric power output rose by 13 per cent in the 14 months efter
Septemb er 1965, the same rate as in the precedin g ll:. months.

Seasona lly ad·

justed steel product ion was 13 per cent higher in Novembe r 1966 than in
Septemb er 19651 which~

in

turn Has 11 per cent below the July 196L} levele

Unemploy ment in Bogota was 906 per cent in Septemb er 1966., as compared to

1

The average effectiv e exchange rate for impo:tts in all of 1966
deprecia ted by 29 per cent as compared to all of 1965.,· The average effectiv
e
e~whange rate for mi~1or e~{ports apprecia ted by -6 per cent in all of J.966 as
compared to all of 19650 Urdinoia and Mallon, .Q.2.o ill•

-339.. 7 per cent in Septem ber 1965 and 7 .4 per cent in Septem
ber. 1964. 1
are no data

on change s

in the rate at wLich capac ity was used.

There

One estima te

is that indus trial output grew by about 7 per cent in 1966,
as compa red to
5 per cent in 1965.

Prelim inary data indica te that real GNP grew by about

6 per cent in 1966, as compa red to 3 per cent in 1965.
on aggreg ative perfor mance is clearl y mixed,

we

While the eviden ce

can conclu de that output may

have- risen slight ly more rapidl y after the second restru
cturin g polici es were
initia ted.
out.,

Clearl y, howev er, they were not given a chance to work themse
lves

In Novem ber 1966 negot iation s over new loans betwee n Colom
bia and the

consu ltative group of nation al and intern ationa l aid agenci
es broke down, 2
and strict contro ls on all foreig n transa ctions were reimpo
sed.
earlie r Colom bian devalu ation, the failur e of · coinci dent·
dealt this experi ment a seriou s blow.

Unlike

good harves ts

Or:ly recent ly are there signs that the

Colom bian govern ment has not conclu ded that the libera lizati
on medici ne was
inappr opriat e-~on ly that foreig n

doctor s

were minist ering it too public ly-

from the·· view of domes tic politi cal feasib ility.

1

a:t~re are no quarte rly unemp loymen t data for the countr y. These
data for Bogota are from survey s by the Unive rsidad de las·
Andes, as cited in
Rober t L, Slight on, Urban Unemp lovmen t in Colom bia: Measu
rement . Charac 
_!:_eri stics, and Pol_if,Y Proble ms (RAND, Januar y 1968, RM--53
93), p. 16.
2
Colom bia also failed to meet the Septem ber 1966 target
for ret for
eign exchan ge reserv es that would have allowe d. it to draw
the final trancl, e
of its IMF standb y. Almost the entire short fall from the
reserv e target
could be accoun ted for by a $60 millio n short fall from projec
ted ~xport
earnin gs (exclu ding petrol eum), and most of this export
short fall repres ented
lm~er than projec ted coffee expor ts. In early 1967 Colom
bia drew $19 milllo n
from the IMF' s Compe nsatory Financ ing Arrang ement, as non-pe
troleum export s
in 1966 were about $12 millio n less than the weigh ted averag
e of actual
1964-6 6 expor ts. This seems to be the case where a short
fall from projec ted
expor ts--as distin ct from a short fall from histor ical expor
ts--ad versel y
affect ed a count ry's develo pment polici ese The IBRD's propos
ed Supple mentar y
Finan cial Measur es is design ed to deal with this proble m.
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Ghana represen ts perhaps the most typica 1 case of an unsucce ssful
attempt at restruct uring a colonia l flow pattern after independ ence.

With-

out going into all the details of the Nkrumah regime it is clear that there ex
isted

a pronounc ed tendency here not only for expansio n of the public sector, but

altio for the continuo us increase in the extent of direct controls on the
shrinkin g private sector,.

The goal of the Ghanaian governm ent during the

1950 1 s can be characte riz~d as a big push for heavy industry with almost
complet e disregar d for Ghana I s compara tive advantag e interna. tionally .

Govern

ment deficit financin g forced resource s into the hands of the public sector.,
more and more industri es were gradual ly brought under direct governm ent
ownersh ip and the licensin g and control arrangem ents in the domestic economy
became more and more pervasiv e.
The realizat ion that policies of the immedia te post"wa r were in fact
.

i

not bringing the desired results came late and
I

in some other countri es.

The persona l

less gradual ly in Ghana than

charisma

of Nkrumah and his

efforts to walk the . pan-Afr ican stage postpone d the day of reckonin g until
1966, in spite of a truly miserab le economic perform ance.

At that.tim e,.

Ghanaia n industry was .operatin g at roughly 35 per cer,t of capacity ; the pro-··
ducts of that industry were selling at from 3 to 4 times CIF interna tional
prices; unernploy .ment wa·s rising rapidly and agricul tural output was virtuall
y
stagnan t.
unusual

·The excesses of the Nkrumah regime in terms of the creation of an
array

-. of "white elephan ts" in the field of public monume nts,'

modern factorie s and the like, pales all other such cases by compari son.
But while the realiz.g tion of the hi.gh cost of pursuing these policies came
only gradual l~ the new military governrr.. ent which took office in February 1966
.cair.e in, in large part, on the basis of a profound dissatis facti.cin with the
economi c performa nce to date.

-35In July 1967 the first substa ntial change s in policy , which
may be
1

ca1 1ed the beginn ing of the second restru cturin g in the
case of Ghana, were
put into effect .

They coHsis ted of a 30 per cent devalu ation of the exchan
ge

rate, an equiva lent rise in the produc er pr:1-ce offere d by
the cocoa marke ting
board (to pass on the benef its of devalu ation to the produ
cer), and some
moves in the direct ion of import libera lizati on.

A very small existi ng open

genera l licens e catego ry was substa ntiall y extend ed to includ
e most spare
parts, chemic als., pig iron, pharm aceuti cals, fertili zer.,
and simple tools,
with the expec tation that 15-20 per cent of import s would
come in under what:
amoun ts to. an autom atic replen ishme nt scheme . · The object
ive of this packag e
was ~o reach 55 per cent of one shift indus trial capac ity
by the end of 1967.
The Ghana ian autho rities, moreo ver, stated their intent ion
to libera lize raw
mater ials as we 11, i.e., as soon ·as the foreig n exchan ge
r.eserv es permi tted
such furthe r libera lizatio n,.

There has thus far been no offici al mentio n of

any intend ed libera lizati on for capita l goods.

Moreov er., the bulk of 1967

impor ts contin ued to be alloca te? under an indivi dual licens
e system , with
1,100 regist ered impor ters making applic ations on the conve
ntiona l basis and
with any new regist rants consid ered in relati on to "their
prospe ctive abilit y
to utiliz e licens es effect ively" .
Clearl y this has consti tuted a small beginn ing in the right
direct ion.·
It is equall y clear that the period since these initia l
steps were taken in
the middle of 1967 is~ too short for any real assess ment
of conseq uences at
this time.

1)

Severa l things can, never theles s, be observ ed, even at this
biIT~:

the Novem ber 1967 post-d evalua tion consum er price index
stood at 6 per

cent below that of a year earlie r.

This happy result can be ..in large part

laid at the doorst ep of an excep tional ly good maize harve
st during calend ar
year 19670

This more than outwei ghed some fncrea se in import prices
in the

-36consu mer pric e index e

In spite of some impo rt liber aJ.iz ati,o n, -~imp
orts in

the secon d half of calen dar 1967 ran at a
level . abou t 20 per cent below that
of the firs t half of the year } For the year
as a whol e, 1967 impo rts were
24 per cent below those plann ed and 16
per cent below 1966 actu als.
On the expo rt side an addi tion al 20·2 5 mill
ion doll ars of annu al e:~po rts,
or an incre ase of

7.lfr per cent , .. is expe cted; timb er expo
rts have alrea dy

incre ased subs tanti ally, .

The incre ase in the coco a price to prod ucer
s has

led to a bett er care of trees ., a decl ine
in smug gling to neig hbor ing coun tries ,
and an estim ated incre ase in the hurv est
of the 1967 crop by 20-2 5 thou sand
tons. , The pictu re on mino r expo rts is less
clea r since the bene fits of de·•
valu ation may not have been pass ed on in
all case s. On the aggr egat ive
leve l GDP in 1967 incre ased by more than
3 per cent comp ared to a 1 per cent
a'!er age earl ier, :i.nd icatin g a net gain in
per capi ta GDP for the firs t time
in 4~5 year s. It woul d, neve rthel ess, be
pre~ ature to attri bute this chan ge
to the bene fits of the new polic y pack age
since clea rly not enou gh time has
as yet elap sed and since unus ually good weat
her cond ition s leadi ng to a very
favo rable harv est must carr y much of the
cred it ..
More over, it shou ld be very clea r that only
very smal l step s have been
take n to date in the dire ction of freei ng
the econo my from the shac kles of the
Nkrum ah poli cies . For one thing , clos e to
75 or 80 per cent of impo rts stil l
rema in very tigh tly cont rolle d and as Worl
d Bank obse rvers conc luded earl ier
this year "par tial evide nce i'ndi cates that
the larg er priv ate and -join t state 
priv ate firm s have adeq uate raw mate rial
impo rts and buil t up inve ntor ies ·
appr oach ing 3-4 mont hs' supp lyo Most state
ente rpris es have more than adeq uate
impo rt mate rials refle cting both ampl e licen
sing alloc ation and cred it. On
the othe r hand , many smal l and mediu m sized
firms stil l do not have adeq uate
ifi!po rted raw mate rials and spar e part s and
the diff icul ties in arra-l 'lging
1
Ther e are some spec ial reaso ns for this ,
rela ting to slow ness in
utili zing avai lable aid.

-37credit undoubte dly play a major part here as well. 11

The import _of 79

specifie d commod ities "which are consider ed to be manufac turable locally in
suffi.cie nt quantiti es" is either restrict ed or complet ely banned.

The

attitude of a substan tial proport ion of the bureauc racy continue s to be one
of pro-libe ralizati on but at a very slow pace and with conside rable trepida••
tions about the excesses of a profit-o riented industr ial system.

Nonethe less

substant :Lal beginnin gs have been made and ·there is talk and some evidence
that as soon as the authori ties feel a little more comfort able about their
(current ly non-exi stent) foreign exchange reserves further li·beral ization
steps will be taken.

There is,, moreove r, a realizat ion that complem entary

policies in the domestic agricul tural sector can be crucial to the overall
liberali zation efforto

Consequ ently market price.fl oors for rice and maize

were announce d for the first tlme early t_his year, improvin g agricul ture's
terms of trade and getting the Governm ent into the business of.supp orting
the private tiade rather than displaci ng it.
I

The required interact ion between

domesti cally oriented agricult ure and industry on which so much depends
has thus been facilita ted.

Whether Ghana has the storage and/ or adminis tra

tive capacity to run a buffer stock operatio n must, however , still be tested.

The main problems facing the Korean economy and those aiding her in
the nineteen fifties were clearly, to help repair the damages sustaine d by
the
triple blow adminis tered since 1%5:

first the departu re of the Japanese .;

second, the partitio n of the immedia te post-wa r; and third, the massive
destruc tion of the Korean War and its aftermat h.

What might be called the

reconstr uction period lasted unti 1 approxim ately 1960 and was characte rized

by a large number of governm ent actions over a large area, mainly intended

· to get the badly mutila ted economy back. on its feet.,

Inevitc1 bJ.y, such actions

I

were, often deficie nt in overal l design and somewlv:it emergen cy oriente
d,.
Moreov er the attemp t to drive resourc es into the hands of the governm
ent
brough t with it inflati onary fiscal policie s which defeate d the
prime develop 
mental purpose s of the program by impairi ng the pr:tvate sector I s
willing ness
and ability to save and invest.

J.n fact, through out the late 50 1 s and even

in the early 60 1 s Korea was racked by substa ntial inflati on in spite
of a
number of major stabili zation efforts assiste d by the United States.

As long

as these efforts were unsucc essful there was little chance to restore
a sensq
of predic tabilit y to econom ic relatio nships an<l'to begin to unloose
n those
forces in the private sector withou t whose contrib ution develop ment
in the
mixed economy is very difficu lt.

'those· relativ ely fine alloca tive decisio ns

which yield better develop mental perform ance cannot be expecte d
to be made by
individ ual decisio n-make rs unless there is some likelih ood that
contra ctual
obligat ions will not be swamped by inflati on and entrep reneur ial
energie s_
will not be diverte d into the circum vention of direct contro ls
and the search
for a quick financ ial return.
By 1963 the back of this self-fe eding inflati onary spiral was finally
broken and the Governm ent of Korea began to turn its attenti on to
the need
for a possib le second restruc turing of the kind we have previou sly
describ ed.,
Like others, it determ ined to first deal with the. foreign exchang
e market
before turning to reform 'in the comple mentary financ ial market .

Exports

amount to about 12 per cent and imports to about 22 per cent of
GNP.

In

May 1964, Korea devalue d by 29 to 96 per cent 1 and unified its various
1

rt is difficu lt to say exactly how much devalu ation occurre d because
Korea had a multip le exchang e rate system, rang(ng from 130 won
per dollar to
190 won per dollar. The new rate was set at 255 won per dollar ..

-39multip le exchan ge rates and introd uced what was suppos ed
to be a floati ng
exchan ge rate.

This floati ng rate fluctu ated betwee n 257 won per dollar
in

May 196t., and 271 -won per dollar in early 1965.

Since then it has fluctu ated

betwee n 274 and 267 won.
Along with this devalu ation, the Korean Govern ment gradu
ally
libera lized its import contro l system throug h· a wideni ng
of import quotas
and the iritrod uction

of

a partia l

export retent ion scheme .

a quasi- autom atic licens ing system was introd uced, with
which

In August 1964
an impor ter

could get autom atic approv al of import licens es equal in
value to 20 per cent
of his export earnin gs! sales to UN forces in Korea, and
g·ol_d sales to the
Bank of Korea·.

In Novem ber 1964 this was increa sed to 25 per cent.

Furthe r

libera lizati on took place in 1965 with an autom atic approv
al system for ll:.95
items, discre tionar y lice11s es for 13D items, and a prohib
ited

list coveri ng

620 items.

This meant that almost 75 per cen~ of non-u .s. aid import
s were
now on an autom atic approv al basis. 1 . This libera lizati on
trend has contin ued
steadi ly until.1 by the first half of 1967, 2, 98li- items are
on the autom atic
approv al list, 142 items are on the discre tionar y licens
ing list and only
362 items are on the prohib ited

or ban list.

Almos t 90 per cent of all im

ports other than those financ ed by U.S. aid are now admitt
ed on an autom atic
replen ishme nt basiso 2

Thus, for all practi cal purpos es, quant itative re

strict ions no longer play an impor tant role in.det ermin g
the struct ure of
Korean impor ts.
After adopti on of the first substa ntive restru cturin g packag
e the·
whole sale price index of import ed goods rose by 29 per
cent betwee n May 1%4

1

Exchan ge Restric t:i,i)f!.§ ,, Seven teenth Annua l Report (HJF,
1966), P• 335.
U.S. aid fina,1c ed 30 per cent of Korean import s in 196f:.•
2
1£.:1.!;!., 1967, P• 374.

-40and January 1965 and then remained almost constanto
was not passed on to other commodities.

But this price increase

The t·otal wholesale price index rose

by only 2 per cent between Nay 196li- and January 1%5; in the twelve months
after devaluation wholesale prices rose by only 5 per cent, as compa1:ed to
52 per cent in the year preceding devaluation.,

This overall stability in

wholesale prices was due in large part to improved agricultural performance
permitting a decline in wholesale grain prices (by 24 per cent between May
196L~ and May 1965, as compared to an increase of 77 per cent between May 1963
and May 1964).

1

Agricultural output (in constant 1960 prices~ in fact, rose

by 18 per cent in 196L~ compared to 6 per cent in 1963.
The simultaneous unific·ation of domestic interest rates at higher,
and more realistic,· 1evels provided for the first time incentives for domestic
saving and production.

The change in overall performance of the Korean

economy has been little short of spectacular,

From negative saving rates in

the 1958-62 period) and at 5.8 per cent as late as 1962-64, Korea is nou ex
periencing saving rates in excess of 13 and 14 per cent.

Manufacturing- out-

put rose by 24 per cent in the 12 months after devaluation, as compared to
an 8 per cent increase over the preceding 12 months.

Exports also responded

extremely well to the devaluation/lib eralization package growing at a 29 per
cent rate during 62-66., compared to 15 per cent in 58-62.
exports have growl:} at close to L,O per cent.

In more recent years

Overall) per capita income

growth has risen from 1 1/2 per cant for the 19'58-62 period to 6- 2 per cent
in the 1962-66 period and in excess of that level in 1967.
1
This same price pattern occurred in the consumer price index. The·
Seoul consumer price index for grains fell by 18 per cent beti,een May 196L:.
and May 1965, while the total consumer price index rose by only 8 per cent
during the 12 months. In the twelve months prior to devaluation it had risen
by lf7 per cent, with grain prices rising by 96 per cent.

The above admi ttedl y rathe r curso ry rev:i.ew of
a numb er of liber aliza 
tion effor ts--o ver an.ad mitte dly rathe r too short
perio d of time- - does not
lend itse lf to grand gene raliz ation s.

Korea , India and Ghana had subs tanti al
~

de jure deva luatio ns coup led with gradu al impo
rt liber aliza tions -~mo re e,r. tensi ve in the case of Korea and -Indi a than
Ghan a.

Colom bia had a large de··

valua tion of the impo rt rate coup led with rapid
libera J.izat :ion-; ' and Paki stan
gradu ally deval ued, - de facto via the expo rt bonus
s·cheme) accom panie d by sub~
stan tial

impo rt liber aliza tion.

None of the exger imen ts have run long

enoug h to perm it great confi denc e to be attac
hed to any conc lusio ns that
might be reach ed.

Some of the exper imen ts, e.g., Colom bia and Pakis
tan} \·Jere ,

more over, interr upte_ d by poli tical <;:ris is or
war; other s suffe red from the
overw helmi ng effec t of exoge nous
India .

shock s ,,1hich swept all befor e it, e.g.,

Neve rthel ess we may be perm_ itted a few tenta tive
obser vatio ns on

the natur e of the secon d restr uctu ring to date
and the direc tions it is l:.Ucely
to take in the futur e.
Even at this early stage there is evide nce of
th~ poss ibili ties of
funda ment al chang es in econo mic perfo rman ce •.
If we take the Pakis tan and
Korea n exam ples which have had the bene fit of
at least seve ral years of
appl icati on and where liber aliza tion did encom
pass capit a 1 good s, as well
as raw mate rials and spare parts , we can note
a real turn- abou t in perfo rman ce,
'
~

wheth er measu red·· in terms of per capit a incom
e grow th, savin g behav ior or
expo rt perfo rman ce.

How much of this is due to the highe r impo rt
level s

made poss ible and how much due to the restr uctu
ring of impo rts itsel f is,
hmve ver, more diffi cult to docur ii'ent.

Trie real test of this would be an

exam inatio n of chang es in the indu stria l produ
ction struc ture as well ·as
betw een indu stry and other secto rs.

In the short -term , chang es in the patte rn

of investm ent allocati on at the mm;gin might have to serve as a proxy.
But neither of these two

exercise s has as yet been carried through due to

problems with data availah ility .•
The extent of "openne ss" of the economy must be of conside rable

relevanc e in terms of the potenti al for good--o r evil- ... of any devalua tion/
liberali zation package .

fil~.!~ .P~~

the· linkages between the foreign

trade sector in a· succesa ful case like Korea I s and the rest of the econor,ry
must have much greater potenti al than in India where the trade tail can't
be e)rpected to

11

wag 11

the developm ent dog.

Secondl y, complem entary policy changes , especia1 ly in the agricult ural. sector and in.cred it markets,

may be of the utmost importan ce.

In the more

success ful cases under scrutiny , eag., Korea and Pakistan , harvests were
-good and agricul tural product ivity was increasi ng substan tially both . wliile
and immedia tely after the ne\~ policies were _adopted .

This is essentia l

if the eroding effects of inflatio n are to be held off and if there is to

be time for the restruct uring process to gather steam.

Complem entary changes -

with devalua tion--on the export side, i.e.) the levying of export duties for
tra-

ditiona l commod ities facing

an i.nelasti c foreign demand~ and the installa tion

of a supplem entary direct export promotio n machine ry, includin g subsidie s,
have been charect eristic in the attempt to accelera te

the usually

somewha t slower response on the export side •.
Thirdly , there can ·-::,e little doubt concern ing the importan ce of
addition a 1 foreign exchange avai labi J.ities for the immedia te post-res tructuri
ng
periodo

At a time when private sector confiden ce still hangs precario usly

in the balance , there is little as importan t as the show of resolute ness and
co:i.siste ncy in

carrying through •with a phased liberali zation program.

Nothing can be as damaging at a time like that than hesitation, or a tem
porary return to restrictionism, none of which is conducive to eliminating
a full-throated response from the previously disenfranchised economic
sector~,whose participation is so essential to final success.

Where foreign

exchange reserves are low, e.g., Ghana, or the confidence on future aid
flows is missing, e~g., Colombia., the private sector is likely to adopt a
wait and wee policy-~proving the skeptics right once again.

But the addi...

tional aid flows are also directly relevant to the ability to contain the in-
evitable inflationary pressures which ensue in the wake of such a policy
shift.

If the higher price of .imports a$sociated with the devaluation,

especially of industrial raw materials and other imports, is not at least
partially offset by the dismantling of controls and the larger volume of
imports now made possible, the impact on consumer price indeces with all
its consequences ~ould have been virtually unavoidable.
j

Finally., it should be clear that our concentration on the dismantling
of quantitative controls as part of the restructuring effort gives us only
a partial or beginning representation of reality.

As is well known, the

typical less developed economy disequilibrium system can also be maintained
by tariff and/or tax/subsidy packages.

Ideally., in fact., we should measure

the total extent of protection by calculating ~he effective tariff on various
industries, including specific tafes, import surcharges and deposit re•
quirements and., in the garden variety of cases in which QR I s are dominant.,,
using the resulting imp licit tariffs (i.e., the percentage difference between
domestic and c. i. fe world prices) as the equivalent of the nominal tariff
structure.

It is, howev.er, true, in terms of a sequential liberalization

e,ffort, that it is the import licensing system which carries the effective
11

bite 11 in most real world cases.

Once this

11

bite 11 is removed, tariffs usually

becom e relev ant, espec ially if some of them have beei1
raise d in the cours e
of the earli er disma ntling of the quan titati ve restri
ction s.,

Not infreq uentl y

the tarif f patte rn that emerg es as bindin g and releva
n11 itsel f shows no really
disce rnabl e logic al patte rn or scien tific basis .
finish ed googs and lmv

A polic y of high tarif fs on

or non-e xisten t tarif fs on interm ediate goods has

usual ly lead to a very high level of effec tive prote
ction for dome stfc pro
ducer s, which polic y, while worki ng throug h the mark.e
t mecha nism, is still
subst antia lly disto rting and blunt ing of the comp
etitiv e press ures which the
polic. y maker s appar ently now want to admit .

·Tari ff ratio naliz ation is

there fore likely to provi de the next- -and hopef ully
final chall enge- -to
those who wish to restru cture the system along more
effic ient lines .

As we look into the futu:c e this will undou btedly requi
re the evolu tion
of a count ry-sp ecific tarif f polic y follow ing the
disma ntling of quan titati ve
restr ictio ns, from which we might then devia te when
neces sary.

In this

conne ction the confu sion betwe en infan t indus try
and reven ue objec tives of
tarif fs must: 'be elimi nated .

In seque ntial termsJ a move towar d a unifor m

tarif f rate, perha ps somew hat lower on raw mater ials
and machi nery than on
finish ed goods , and the subst itutio n of excis es for
tariff s in the luxur y
good categ ory 1 may be sensi ble,

This unifor m tarif f can then over time be

lower ed very much in the manne r of a gradu al withd
rawal of tempo rary prefe rence s.
Devia tions from- unifo rmity a long the vJay would have
to be defen ded in terms
~

of a convi ncing infan t indus try argum ent and prote
ctive tarif fs set in
relat ion to some objec tive crite rion such as domes
'
tic value added at world
price s.

2

But this takes us beyon d the bound aries of the prese
nt paper .

1
See R. McKin non, Tarif f and Comm odity.T ax Reform
in Korea 0 mimeo ,
July, 19-67.
2
This sugge stion :i.s made by R. McKin non, .QR• cit.

